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ABSTRACT
Experimental philosophy brings empirical methods to philosophy. These 
methods are used to probe how people think about philosophically 
interesting things such as knowledge, morality, and freedom. This paper 
explores the contribution that qualitative methods have to make in 
this enterprise. I argue that qualitative methods have the potential to 
make a much greater contribution than they have so far. Along the way, 
I acknowledge a few types of resistance that proponents of qualitative 
methods in experimental philosophy might encounter, and provide reasons 
to think they are ill-founded.
Section 1 introduces experimental philosophy and outlines experimental philosophers’ current meth-
ods. Section 2 provides a basic introduction to qualitative methods, data gathering, and analysis and 
articulates how such methods might contribute to experimental philosophy. Section 3 articulates a 
major potential line of resistance to the incorporation of qualitative methods which focuses on the 
idea that experimental philosophers are interested in investigating particular types of mental process-
ing—intuitive processing—for which a qualitative methodology would be a poor resource. Section 4 
responds to this objection by examining the basic motivations for experimental philosophy and the 
various ways in which it has been claimed that empirical data can make an important philosophical 
contribution, finding no justification for a near exclusive focus on intuitive processing. Section 5 
then deals with a number of other objections and clarifies my recommendations before I conclude 
in section 6.
1. Experimental Philosophy
Experimental philosophy is a new sub-discipline of philosophy. Experimental philosophers aim to 
make philosophical contributions by using empirical tools to probe how people (typically ordinary 
folks, although sometimes philosophers themselves or other populations) think about philosophically 
interesting phenomena.
True to their name, experimental philosophers run experiments. In these experiments, participants 
consider cases and their judgments about the cases are recorded. For example, a participant might con-
sider a Gettier (1963) case and be asked to what extent they agree with the statement ‘John knows that 
…’. Experimental philosophers aim not just to find out what judgments people make about particular 
cases, they “run systematic experiments aimed at understanding how people ordinarily think about 
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the issues at the foundations of philosophical discussions” (The Experimental Philosophy Page, n.d.). 
Philosophy experiments investigate the factors that influence participants’ judgments. These factors 
include interpersonal factors such as ethnicity, but more typically these factors are intrapersonal. An 
intrapersonal factor might concern the content of the case, such as how much rides on John’s being 
right. Or it might concern the conditions in which the participant views the case. Is the participant 
suffering from ego depletion? Is the participant in smelly or non-smelly environs (see Schnall et al., 
2008)?1
While experimental philosophy is interested in how participants think about relevant issues, par-
ticipants in these experiments are almost never asked what factors they think are relevant in their 
decision making. They are not generally even asked, for instance:
Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement:
Considerations of luck were important when coming to my decision
(disagree) 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 (agree)
In other words, experimental philosophers do not typically try to ascertain what is consciously going 
through participants’ heads when they think about philosophically interesting things.
We’ll consider why this is the case in section 3. First, however, we should note that there exists 
a host of empirical tools designed to get at how participants think in precisely this sense. The scale 
above would be a pretty crude way to do this. A better way would involve gathering qualitative data. 
Let’s quickly look at what this would entail and how philosophers might make use of qualitative data.
2. Qualitative Methods
This section is not intended as a how-to guide for using qualitative methods in philosophy nor as a com-
prehensive survey of qualitative methodology. It is a brief and incomplete introduction to qualitative 
methods for those not familiar with them. I concentrate on those aspects of qualitative methodology 
which I envisage being of most use to philosophers.
2.1. Qualitative data gathering
The distinctive aspect of qualitative data is that it involves open response answers.2 Participants are 
not asked to respond “yes” or “no,” nor are they asked to indicate a level of agreement with a particular 
statement. Rather, questions are asked which give participants the opportunity to provide an open 
response in their own terms.
The most straightforward way of gathering qualitative data would be via surveys which incorporate 
open response questions. This form of qualitative data gathering can be thought of as an alternative 
way of delivering a structured, qualitative interview. Verbal interviews are historically the meat and 
bread of qualitative research. Interviews can be more or less structured. A more structured interview 
closely resembles a research questionnaire, albeit one in which the interviewer reads the questions 
aloud and the interviewee responds aloud (Brinkmann, 2014). Highly structured interviews can also 
be administered by email. Telephone interviews can be used (experimental philosophers have made 
some use of telephone surveys, but not to gather qualitative data, see Ahlenius & Tännsjö, 2012).
Conducting interviews face-to-face is more typical in qualitative research, as it allows for more 
freedom in the structure of the interview. At the more unstructured end of the scale, “after the opening 
request for a narrative, the main role of the interviewer is to remain a listener … sporadically asking 
questions that may clarify” (Brinkmann, 2014). In all cases, structured or unstructured, the conver-
sation is recorded and, when necessary, transcribed. It is worth noting that in addition to questions, 
an interviewer can make use of other prompts to elicit a response from participants, such as images, 
thought experiments, or philosophically interesting cases.
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Focus groups are another way to gather qualitative data. A focus group is an informal discussion 
among a small group of participants, usually numbering between six and eight and rarely over twelve 
(Wilkinson, 1998). This discussion is on a topic provided by the researcher. Again, this might include 
questions, images, or a philosophically interesting case or thought experiment. Discussion can be more 
or less structured. The discussion may be directed by a moderator, frequently the researcher, but the 
aim is to capture discussion between participants. Again, the discussion is recorded and transcribed.
The final data gathering method which I will consider is what I shall call a ‘think aloud study’ (see 
Van Someren et al., 1994 for the background to such methods). In the context I have in mind, such a 
study might involve a participant being asked to complete a survey of the type used in standard phi-
losophy experiments and, while completing it, being asked to think aloud by vocalizing their thought 
processes as they decide how to answer the questions on the survey. Again, this can be recorded 
and transcribed. (Such methods are sometimes called ‘concurrent protocol analysis’, see Baldacchino 
et al., 2014.) An alternative method involves having participants fill out a survey and afterwards asking 
them to articulate why they answered the questions as they did.
2.2. Qualitative data analysis
The analysis of qualitative data can take a number of forms. There are some set qualitative research 
paradigms which stipulate certain approaches (for examples, see Bryant & Charmaz, 2007 on Grounded 
Theory or Smith et al., 2009 on Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis). However, I foresee a rather 
more straightforward approach being of most use to philosophers. Here I will describe a basic approach 
to the analysis of qualitative data (for more on the basics, see Saldaña, 2013).
Qualitative data gathering typically results in a large body of text. This text is then broken down 
into segments and coded. The appropriate length of the segments depends on the purpose of the 
research, but a fairly typical unit might be a sentence or small group of sentences. The researcher 
assigns segments to a code or set of codes which identify particular themes in the data. Codes can 
represent particular ideas expressed by the text. They can also represent other features of the text, such 
as confusion, apparent contradiction, or belief revision. Codes can also be clustered under higher-order 
codes in order to better represent the themes that emerge.
The researcher develops a coding manual containing a clear and precise description of each code. 
This helps to ensure consistency in coding. It facilitates the establishment of inter-coder reliability, so 
that when multiple coders work with the same manual one can check the degree to which the coders 
agree. A coding manual can be decided in advance (this is sometimes described as “a priori”). More 
typically, however, the construction of the final coding manual in the analysis of qualitative data is an 
iterative process. This means that the coding is done in several stages as the coding manual develops.
A completely preset coding manual might be appropriate for some research aims. In many philo-
sophical applications, it may be appropriate to set certain codes in advance. For instance, in a think 
aloud study, one would likely be looking out for certain typical problems that participants encounter. 
At the other end of the scale, researchers might initially be completely open in the first pass of process 
of iterative coding. This means that a researcher approaches the text with no specific hypotheses in 
mind, trying to distance their analysis from any expectations they have about important themes. A 
completely open initial coding would likely be inappropriate for philosophical use as the research 
questions are likely to be more targeted. However, allowing a coding manual to develop via an iterative 
process of coding does not mean that the initial stages of coding must be open. The idea of such an 
iterative process is that as one codes the data the codes themselves develop as one’s understanding 
of the date develops. The descriptions of codes may be refined during this process. One may see a 
need to collapse codes or create new ones. Having developed a better understanding of the themes 
that emerge, one will likely have to go back and recode the data using the refined coding manual. The 
process of qualitative analysis is often iterative with researchers coding and recoding until they are 
happy that the codes capture the themes apparent in the data.
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It is important to note that quantitative information can help one’s analysis of qualitative data. For 
instance, information about the frequencies of certain codes or words in the data, collocation data 
relating to words, or the overlap of particular codes can help one identify important themes in the data.
2.3. Philosophical uses of qualitative methods
Experimental philosophers do not tend to use qualitative methods. A brief quantitative survey illus-
trates this fact. A list was made of articles from 2014 that were indexed by a popular resource with 
experimental philosophers (The Experimental Philosophy Page, n.d.).3 The complete list contained 
57 articles. These were categorized as non-empirical (i.e., presenting no novel data), quantitative, and 
qualitative. Papers were only classified as qualitative if qualitative data was collected, analyzed, and 
featured in the presented results (as something other than a manipulation check). Of the 36 empirical 
articles in the sample, only one was classified as qualitative.4 My main aim in this paper is to argue 
that qualitative methods have the potential to make a much greater contribution to experimental 
philosphy than they do at present.
How might experimental philosophers use qualitative methods? I think that the most important 
contribution they have to make is in supplementing the methods already used by experimental phi-
losophers. Qualitative tools are typically used to supplement other types of methods. For instance, 
Wilkinson (1998) notes that focus groups are often used either “in an initial exploratory or hypoth-
esis-generation phase, prior to developing a…questionnaire” (p. 184) or “in a final follow-up phase, 
to pursue an interesting finding from a large-scale survey, or simply to add richness and depth to a 
project” (pp. 184–185).
What are the advantages of employing more qualitative tools? Qualitative methods can be used 
to gain insight into how participants think and talk about philosophically interesting phenomena 
for themselves. Of course, quantitative surveys can do this. However, qualitative methods can give 
researchers much deeper insights. The reason is that they remove certain barriers. For example, it might 
be otherwise very unclear how participants understand the question they are asked. Or there might 
be very important aspects of how a given participant thinks about an issue which a fixed response 
format might provide no ability to express, and which will consequently remain unknown to philos-
ophy. Another barrier which is removed is that participants are able to respond in their own words, 
so one can gain an insight into the way in which the “philosophical” usage of a term, as employed in 
a philosopher’s experimental materials, may not match the ways ordinary folks use the term.
For example, Strohminger and Nichols (2014) probes folk ideas about personal identity in five 
experiments.5 The headline finding is that “moral traits [such as honesty and racism] are considered 
more important to personal identity than any other part of the mind” (p. 168). One might wonder 
exactly how these results should feed into philosophical debate about personal identity. One might 
wonder whether participants should be interpreted as expressing any thoughts about numerical per-
sonal identify when they select one end of the scale (“Jack is completely different now”) as opposed 
to the other (“Jack is the same person as before”). These sorts of questions can be asked about many 
philosophical experiments. Sometimes they can be raised in a dismissive context, implying that par-
ticipants simply fail to understand the relevant philosophical concepts, undermining the results. But 
that is not the context in which I raise them in here. Results such as Strohminger and Nichols’s are not 
valuable only insofar as they concern participants’ thoughts about personal identity as it is typically 
understood by philosophers. If it turns out that ordinary folks have little traction on a philosophical 
notion of personal identity and that the sense of a person “being the same person as before” which 
matters to them is something quite different, that is a philosophically important finding. The reason 
that I raise these questions here is that without further data, it is difficult to know which philosophi-
cally interesting lesson to take from such studies—the one concerning philosophers’ understanding 
of personal identity or the other. What further data is needed? The most effective method would 
involve gathering qualitative data, perhaps via an interview format which allowed researchers the 
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flexibility to probe how participants think about personal identity. Such an interview could start by 
asking participants simply to explain in their own words why they give the answers they do, or what 
they mean when they say that “Jack is the same person as before,” and then follow up on that answer 
in order to gain deeper insight.6
For other philosophical purposes, something like a focus group might be more helpful. Advantages 
to focus groups include the fact that they afford insight into the ways that participants speak about 
and use philosophical concepts in the real world. In a one-on-one interview, participants are engaged 
in conversation with a researcher who guides the discussion using particular language and according 
to the researcher's understanding of the issues. Of course, a focus group can’t guarantee complete eco-
logical validity, as it were, as it is still a pretty artificial setting.7 However, they do represent a marked 
improvement on survey responses or other interview types. The direction and language of the con-
versations is directed primarily by participants themselves rather than a researcher. A philosophical 
question which I can imagine being explored in this way is the extent to which ordinary thinking 
about distinctions between beliefs, thoughts, and knowledge map onto philosophical discussions in 
epistemology. Why would this be a valuable project? Well, many epistemologists acknowledge that 
terms such as ‘believe’ and ‘know’ as used by philosophers disconnect in important ways from the 
ordinary use of those terms. Whether that is a problem depends on your general metaphilosophical 
stance. Perhaps you think that the terms as used by philosophers are simply terms of art and the 
resemblance to ordinary English words is a red herring, in which case it would be no surprise if you 
were not interested in the kind of empirical work I am suggesting. Perhaps, however, you think that 
the importance and interest of many epistemological debates is rooted in puzzles that arise in our 
ordinary epistemic lives, our ordinary ways of thinking and talking about beliefs, and our ordinary 
practices of belief formation. And, if that description fits, you should recognize value in a project that 
attempts to articulate how people consciously think about beliefs and belief formation.
Hofmann and colleagues (2014) use a different technique for a similar purpose. They motivate 
their study thus:
Despite considerable scientific and practical interest in issues of morality, virtually no research has taken morality 
science out of these artificial settings and directly asked people about whether and how they think about morality 
and immorality in the course of their everyday lived experience.
They prompted each participant in their sample (N = 1252) to respond to a survey via their smart phone 
five times a day for three days. First, participants were asked to indicate whether they had committed, 
been the target of, or witnessed a moral or an immoral act. The follow up questions then included open 
response questions as to what the event was about, its location, and so on. These responses were coded 
according to a manual, drawing on research on Moral Foundations Theory (see, e.g., Graham et al., 
2012). Hofmann and colleagues conclude that their “everyday-life approach” suggests new categories 
such as honesty and self-discipline which are not part of Moral Foundations Theory. The study also 
reveals that the differences in the ways that liberals and conservatives think about moral issues are 
more nuanced than controlled experiments would suggest.
One area in which qualitative data gathering could be particularly helpful for experimental phi-
losophers is in scale development. A scale is a device used in a quantitative study to measure some 
construct or set of constructs. In experimental philosophy, the Free Will and Moral Responsibility 
Scale has been developed to gauge the extent to which participants think particular cases involve an 
agent who is free and morally responsible (see Andow & Cova, 2016, for an example of this scale in 
use). Scales comprise a number of “items,” or statements. Participants are asked to indicate their level 
of agreement with each item or to indicate how closely they think the item describes them.8
Scale development involves a number of steps. The first step typically involves generating a num-
ber of items and then refining them to find a subset or subsets with high internal validity. One way 
for researchers to do this is to come up with a number of items which they think might be relevant. 
However, this is potentially quite limiting if one really wants to understand how participants think 
about these issues.
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The use of qualitative data can help avoid these limitations in at least two ways. First, open response 
data from a preliminary survey can be used in the initial stages as a source of items for later scale 
development. For instance, exact quotes from participants could be used as items. This provides 
some assurance that the scale will measure the most significant aspects of the ways participants think 
about the relevant issues. Second, qualitative data can be helpful in assessing the face validity of items 
or sets of items. For example, they can be applied to the end product, helping to assess the external 
validity of the refined scale. A researcher can subject a set of items to a think aloud study. Analysis of 
the gathered data can then allow one to identify problems with items which might cast the validity of 
any scale using them into doubt (such as items that participants systematically understand in a way 
which doesn’t match the researchers’ expectations).9
3. Qualitative methods and intuitive processing
In this section, I consider a principled objection to my proposal that qualitative methods have much 
to contribute to experimental philosophy. This is an objection I take seriously, as it is a plausible 
argument that experimental philosophers should avoid qualitative methods. Nonetheless, I think this 
objection is mistaken. This section is not concerned with why in fact experimental philosophers have 
made no great use of qualitative methods. There needn’t be an interesting answer to that question. It 
might be simply that it has never occurred to them, that they didn’t get around to it yet, or that they 
are leaving it to someone else.
Why might one think that qualitative methods are out of place in experimental philosophy? One 
plausible reason appeals to the idea that experimental philosophy is concerned with intuitions. Not 
all characterizations of experimental philosophy place as much weight on this. I haven’t, for reasons 
which should become clear. However, it is very common to characterize experimental philosophy as 
the empirical investigation of intuitions (see, e.g., Alexander, 2012). Indeed, it is common to premise 
the philosophical relevance of the empirical work done by experimental philosophers on the idea that 
they investigate intuitions. The idea is that intuitions play a role in philosophy, and so experimental 
philosophy can contribute to philosophy by speaking to that use of intuitions (more on this later).
If this is right, then there might be a reason to think qualitative methods have little to contribute. 
There is much debate about how to characterize intuitions, but a very common characterization takes 
intuitions to be non-inferential judgements that are not a product of conscious reasoning, are fairly 
immediate, and not slowly or carefully reasoned. There might seem to be good reason to think that 
qualitative methods will be next to useless for probing such intuitive thinking. The data which quali-
tative methods capture concern more “reflective” thinking. They capture participants’ thoughts about 
their deliberation process and their process of reasoning to arrive at an answer. Of course, there is no 
obvious reason to think that qualitative data could not in principle tell you anything about subper-
sonal, “intuitive” processing. Others have advocated methods such as think aloud studies as ways to 
do precisely that, in the context of exploring intuitive expertise (Baldacchino et al., 2014). However, 
there may be reason to think that qualitative methods are unsuitable for measuring the ordinary, 
subpersonal mechanisms underlying processes like moral judgment.
One way of elaborating this line of objection draws on psychological research about participants’ 
self-knowledge. Generally, one of the lessons we have learned from modern psychology is that partic-
ipants often do not have good access to the reasons for the judgments they make or to how they arrive 
at decisions—they seem to have much less access than we might previously have assumed (for a survey 
of the relevant literature, see Schwitzgebel, 2014). Psychologists have, in recent decades, found evidence 
that much of our decision-making appears to be guided by processes other than conscious reasoning.
One sign of this is that it is now very common to use a dual-process framework when theorizing 
about cognition (see, e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Here’s a rather simplistic summary. This popular 
picture is that there are broadly two types of judgment delivery system installed in our heads: one is 
fast (system 1) and the other slow (system 2). The former is unconscious, fast, effortless, heuristic, 
associative, and emotional. The latter is conscious, slow, effortful, and logical. These two types of 
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processes are often supposed to work in tandem, the former delivering quick answers via a process to 
which we have no introspective access while the latter then trundles away, consciously deliberating to 
a reasoned answer. For present purposes, it doesn’t really matter whether these two types of processing 
are best thought of as the result of two domain-general systems of processing. (For a useful summary 
of all the features associated with the two types of processing posited by dual-process and dual-system 
accounts, see Frankish, 2010, p. 922.)
One reason dual-process accounts have garnered so much interest is that a rather larger proportion 
of our decision-making than one might have originally expected seems to fall into the system 1 cate-
gory. Also, when our judgments are the result of such fast, intuitive processing, evidence suggests that 
we are very bad sources of information about the factors which led to those decisions. When asked 
why they made a decision, the answers people produce seem often to be pure confabulation (for an 
overview, see Carruthers, 2010, 2013).
Putting this together, we can ask the same questions again. Why might one think that qualitative 
tools have no significant contribution to make to experimental philosophy? It might seem that a 
rationale has been established. Intuitions play a role in philosophy. Experimental philosophy should 
thus focus on peoples’ intuitions about philosophically interesting things and in the intuitive processing 
underlying those intuitions. So there is little value in exploring what people say when you ask about 
their decision making.
4. The relevance of reflective processing
Let’s grant a rough distinction between intuitive thinking in the narrow, system 1 sense and more 
reflective thinking. The objection I’m considering goes as follows. Philosophers use the products 
of intuitive thinking, and experimental philosophy is therefore philosophically relevant because it 
investigates intuitive thinking. Qualitative methods are no good are investigating intuitive thinking, 
and therefore they have no contribution to make to experimental philosophy.
Here’s the essence of my response. Philosophers don’t just use intuitive thinking in this narrow sense. 
Philosophers draw on more reflective aspects of ordinary thought about philosophically interesting 
things as well, so qualitative methods have a philosophical contribution to make. The motivations 
behind experimental philosophy and the typical reasons for thinking that the data it provides can 
make a philosophical contribution would in no way justify limiting experimental philosophy to the 
investigation of intuitive thought. So the philosophical contribution to be made by qualitative data 
seems to fit into the experimental philosophy project.
To make this response, I’ll first consider the more general explanations of the aims of experimental 
philosophy which have been given in the literature, finding in them no justification for an exclusive 
focus on intuitive thinking. Then, I move on to examine some specific ways in which the empirical 
data about people’s thinking about philosophically interesting things gathered by experimental philos-
ophers can contribute to philosophical debate, and again I’ll find among them no justification for an 
exclusive focus on intuitive thinking. In fact, I will emphasize that all these various ways of motivating 
experimental philosophy in fact make it clear that qualitative methods have an important role to play 
and an important philosophical contribution to make.
4.1. General motivations
We can get a good picture by getting back to basics. In their Experimental Philosophy Manifesto, Knobe 
and Nichols (2008) open as follows:
It used to be a commonplace that the discipline of philosophy was deeply concerned with questions about the 
human condition. Philosophers thought about human beings and how their minds worked. They took an interest 
in reason and passion, culture and innate ideas, the origins of people’s moral and religious beliefs. On this tradi-
tional conception, it wasn’t particularly important to keep philosophy clearly distinct from psychology, history, 
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or political science. Philosophers were concerned, in a very general way, with questions about how everything 
fit together. (p. 3)
The new movement of experimental philosophy seeks a return to this traditional vision. Like philosophers of 
centuries past, we are concerned with questions about how human beings actually happen to be. We recognize 
that such an inquiry will involve us in the study of phenomena that are messy, contingent, and highly variable 
across times and places, but we do not see how that fact is supposed to make the inquiry any less genuinely 
philosophical. On the contrary, we think that many of the deepest questions of philosophy can only be properly 
addressed by immersing oneself in the messy, contingent, highly variable truths about how human beings really 
are (emphasis added). (p. 12)
Hopefully, it is clear in such statements that there is nothing that would suggest that experimental 
philosophers should be interested only in intuitions. However, I should note that this interest in “how 
human beings really are” and about “how their minds work” does, even in Knobe and Nichols's man-
ifesto, end up being parsed in terms of intuitions.
More and more, philosophers are coming to feel that questions about how people ordinarily think have great phil-
osophical significance in their own right. So, for example, it seems to us that there are important philosophical 
lessons to be gleaned from the study of people’s intuitions about causation, but we do not think that the significance 
of these intuitions is exhausted by the evidence they might provide for one or another metaphysical theory. On 
the contrary, we think that the patterns to be found in people’s intuitions point to important truths about how the 
mind works, and these truths—truths about people’s minds, not about metaphysics—have great significance for 
traditional philosophical questions (emphasis added). (p. 12)
Given the prevalence of intuition-talk in experimental philosophy, it is easy to read such statements 
as suggesting that what experimental philosophers are really interested in is intuitions. That interpre-
tation is fine if ‘intuitions’ merely means ‘judgments about philosophically interesting things’. But if 
that’s the interpretation, such statements do not suggest that the real interest is in intuitions in the very 
specific sense discussed above. In fact, quite to the contrary, this interpretation would include reflective 
thinking and thus is no barrier to the idea that qualitative methods can contribute to experimental 
philosophy. On the other hand, if you do try to read ‘intuitions’ in the more specific sense, then the 
position seems rather strange. It is far from clear what part of the general motivations stated in the 
above passage would mandate this slide from a general interest in how people think to a more specific 
interest in their system 1 intuitions. It seems that one should take the more permissive reading.
I foresee a potential objection here. Why should we take the more general motivations to accurately 
capture the nature and philosophical relevance of experimental philosophy? Maybe the opening of this 
manifesto, and other more general statements of the motivation for doing experimental philosophy, 
are simply too loosely stated. Maybe the real interest is not in how people think about philosophically 
interesting stuff in general, but rather in their intuitive thinking in the more specific sense. That isn’t 
right. To see why, let’s look at some more specific ways in which the empirical data gathered by exper-
imental philosophers about how people think has been claimed to be of potential philosophical value.
4.2. Specific motivations
There are five main ways in which experimental philosophers’ data about how people think about phil-
osophically interesting things has been considered philosophically valuable. I’ll examine them in turn.10
4.2.1. Enriching philosophers’ evidence base
Experimental philosophy has been claimed to contribute to philosophy by providing more evidence 
of the same type as that already used, albeit perhaps from a more diverse sample and collected more 
systematically. Philosophers have always given weight to ordinary ways of thinking about things. 
Philosophers of time, for example, pay attention to our ordinary understanding of time. They want 
an account which ultimately is not only coherent (and perhaps empirically adequate), but which 
makes sense of our ordinary ways of thinking about time, passage, the past, and so on. All else equal, 
accordance with our ordinary ways of thinking about time is a sign that a theory is true, while con-
flicting with those ways of thinking is a sign that a theory is false. Experimental philosophy can help 
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by revealing all sorts of features of our ordinary ways of thinking about the world which were not 
apparent through introspection or consultation with those around us, and so can serve to provide us 
with better evidence. (This is the hope of the “positive program” in experimental philosophy, although 
not all experimental philosophers share this hope. See Alexander, 2012.)
Note that nothing here suggests that an exclusive focus on our fast, intuitive, judgments about cases 
would be appropriate. For example, when considering whether a theory of time fits with the ordinary 
ways we think, the focus isn’t solely on intuitive judgments in some narrow sense. Many things are 
relevant—the way we talk about past events, the way we think about what is possible for people to 
achieve in the past, present, and future, and the fact that it simply feels odd to us to claim that dino-
saurs are as real as our children. Consider what we would make of the following situation. Suppose 
that our intuitive, quick, unconsidered response to a case is P, but upon a moment’s reflection, every 
ordinary person would immediately think that P is incorrect. Would or should philosophers only be 
interested in the immediate reaction? The answer is clearly no. Perhaps philosophers should give it 
some attention. It is an interesting feature of the kind of beings that we are. But we are also the kind 
of beings that have and value considered responses to philosophically interesting cases. So it seems 
clear that qualitative methods have something to contribute by providing more evidence for philosophy 
of the same type that they already use.
4.2.2. Challenging philosophers’ supposed evidence base
Experimental philosophy has been claimed to contribute to philosophy by leading us to reconsider 
what we take to be evidence. As I have argued, philosophers give weight to ordinary ways of thinking. 
Sometimes experiments can contribute by revealing features of our ordinary ways of thinking about 
the world which might lead us to reconsider the amount of weight we give to such considerations in 
our theorizing. (This is the aim of the “negative program” of experimental philosophy. See Alexander, 
2012). The influence of certain factors on our ways of thinking might, on reflection, be taken as a sign 
that our ordinary ways of thinking are erroneous, for example, if they are sensitive to irrelevant factors.
Nothing here suggests that an exclusive focus on our fast, intuitive judgments about such cases 
would be appropriate. It is true that philosophers’ thinking is influenced by fast, immediate responses. 
Sometimes, perhaps often, these immediate judgments are simply taken up by more explicit reasoning 
processes and have a significant effect on theory. So it makes sense to be interested in the provenance 
of our judgments about philosophically interesting phenomena. And, given our comparative ignorance 
about fast, intuitive judgments, we should perhaps be more worried about such judgments than those 
which are the product of more explicit processing. However, there seems to be no reason not to be 
interested in the way that people consciously reason about things. The provenance of our immediate 
responses is interesting, but is only one facet of a fully developed empirical program that investigates 
how people think about time, morality, art, knowledge, and other phenomena. Qualitative research 
could reveal, for example, common assumptions or associations that play a role in our thinking about 
philosophical issues, but are problematic for some reason. So it seems that qualitative methods have 
a significant part to play here too. Of course, causal links are difficult or impossible to establish with 
purely qualitative methods. One might need to do this in order to show that, for example, intuitions 
are affected by a certain irrelevant factor. But I am not suggesting that qualitative methods be used in 
isolation. They can help an attempt to challenge philosophers’ evidence base by providing a source of 
well-informed hypotheses.
4.2.3. Catalyzing reflection
Experimental philosophy has been claimed to contribute to philosophy by catalyzing reflection on 
ways of thinking that philosophers have taken for granted. All disciplines have to take some things for 
granted. However, it is healthy for such ways of thinking to be questioned and subjected to reflective 
scrutiny. The thought is that experimental findings, such as those showing that different types of people 
think in different ways about morality, can serve as an effective catalyst for philosophical reflection 
about morality (Knobe & Nichols, 2008, p. 11).
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But, again, there is no motivation here for an exclusive focus on intuitions. Different cultures have 
different religions, world-views, legal systems, cultural practices, gender roles, and so on. Indeed, these 
are precisely the types of difference that Knobe and Nichols have in mind. All of these things go far 
beyond the immediate responses people have to cases. Finding out that members of a culture reason 
about X and conceptualize X in a very different way than members of another culture can surely serve 
as an important catalyst for reflection. But, it is not only facts about intuitions that can play this role. 
Indeed, it seems that the fact that people consciously construct and reflectively endorse completely 
different moral systems is likely to serve as a much more powerful catalyst than their having divergent 
immediate responses (although I accept that this an empirical claim, susceptible to empirical discon-
firmation). So, clearly qualitative methods have a role to play in providing these catalysts.
4.2.4. Otherwise informing our understanding of ordinary ways of thinking
Experimental philosophy’s contribution doesn’t have to be linked to evidence or to catalyzing reflection. 
Philosophers sometimes treat ordinary ways of thinking as a starting point. Sometimes it is thought 
to be part of the job of a philosopher to make sense of our ordinary ways of thinking. Experimental 
philosophy can therefore contribute by discovering surprising aspects of our ways of thinking—aspects 
which were not apparent from the armchair. Once philosophers become aware of surprising aspects 
of our ways of thinking, they can then think carefully about those aspects. Experimental philosophy 
might simply provide a better idea of the ordinary ways of thinking that it is the philosopher’s job 
to make sense of. Or it might help us examine which ordinary ways of thinking we should treat as a 
starting point. Experiments simply provide additional things to philosophize about.
My point will now be familiar. Data about intuitions, in the restricted sense, has an important 
contribution to make in this way. However, so does qualitative data relating to more reflective ways 
of thinking. When philosophers treat ordinary ways of thinking as a starting point for inquiry, or as 
something it is the philosopher’s job to make sense of, they do not restrict themselves to intuitive ways 
of thinking. We want to make sense of our ways of thinking about moral responsibility. That means 
that we are interested in aspects of thinking which qualitative methods provide a way to explore. We 
are interested in practices of praise and blame. We are interested in the sorts of principles people for-
mulate for themselves. We ask about the role that responsibility plays in our wider moral framework. 
We are interested in the ways that people consciously reason about these things.
4.2.5. Conceptual analysis
Finally, experimental philosophy has been claimed to contribute to philosophy by contributing to the 
project of conceptual analysis. Whether as an end in itself or as a stepping-stone to inquiry about the 
world, philosophers have always been interested in the structure of our concepts and in the relations 
between our concepts. Views about what concepts are vary, as do views about what conceptual anal-
ysis is interested in analyzing. Be that as it may, it is common to treat data concerning how we apply 
concepts, or about how acceptable we find certain applications of concepts, as evidence about the 
concepts themselves. Philosophical experiments can provide a rich source of such data for the project 
of conceptual analysis (see, e.g., Knobe, 2007). Experiments can detect subtle differences between cases. 
They can detect subtle differences in how willing we are to attribute knowledge, intentional action, and 
other philosophically interesting predicates in such cases. They can detect subtle differences which are 
not readily apparent through introspection. Therefore, they enable us to paint a better picture of how we 
think about such concepts and about the various factors relevant to our application of those concepts.
Can qualitative data contribute as well? This isn’t a straightforward question. The idea of concep-
tual analysis is a little slippery. It is not always clear what the target of conceptual analysis is. There is 
disagreement among philosophers as to what they are doing when they do conceptual analysis. This is 
worth noting because there is an understanding of conceptual analysis on which data about intuitive 
thinking would be relevant but data about more reflective thinking would not. Suppose that concepts 
are such that the most useful information available to us in their analysis is information about people’s 
fast, immediate, non-reflective judgments about whether particular cases fall within the extension 
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of the concept. Such concepts would be something like subpersonal psychological structures with 
application conditions (of some form) that represent features of the world.
However, I think it should be pretty clear that this sense of conceptual analysis is pretty restricted, 
and that most philosophers who analyze concepts are interested in more than simply having a clear 
understanding of the ways in which humans quickly divide up the world at the subpersonal level. That 
is not to say that philosophers are not interested in concepts in this more restricted sense, just that they 
are interested in something else too. For example, suppose that we were interested in analyzing the 
concept of action. Data about people’s more reflective ways of thinking is typically taken to be relevant 
to the philosophical project of analyzing such a concept. When people reflect on the relevant cases 
again, what type of considerations leap out at them? Which types of cases are they most confident that 
they have classified correctly? What relations do they consciously make with other concepts? What 
priority do they give to their first impressions about concept application, once they reflect on issues 
of moral responsibility or knowledge? Qualitative data could be invaluable in providing this richer 
understanding of people’s concepts.
5. Clarifications
I am not raising an objection to experimental philosophy as currently practiced. Saying that X could 
be augmented by the incorporation of Y is not an objection to X. However, I think that there has 
sometimes been too much focus on intuitive thinking, in the restricted sense of fast, non-inferential 
processing.
I am not saying there is a problem with experimental methods for investigating the sort of thing which 
experimental philosophy investigates. I am recommending that experimental philosophers supplement 
their current toolkit. Using qualitative research to get some traction on how people think can provide 
an excellent basis upon which to design the necessary quantitative methods of experimental philoso-
phy (including surveys, scales, and the like) to track participants’ thinking (including more reflective 
thinking) in quantifiable terms for use within experimental studies.
I am not saying that philosophers shouldn’t be interested in subpersonal, fast, intuitive classification of 
philosophically interesting cases. They should. But they are and should be interested in more reflective 
thinking too.
I am not claiming experimental philosophers have never collected qualitative data. They have, although 
typically in the form of open response survey questions, generally to perform manipulation checks 
and the like within an experimental project.11 The claim is that qualitative methods have much more 
to contribute than they have so far. I am also not claiming to be the only researcher to have called for 
a greater use of qualitative tools.12
I am not claiming that empirical work which draws purely on qualitative data would be of any value. 
Perhaps it might. Perhaps it mightn’t. There’s no obvious reason to think that it could never be. But 
I don’t aim to argue either way. For all I have said, it might be the case that any project which used 
qualitative data to investigate how people think about philosophically interesting things and which 
did not supplement this with more quantitative methods would be of only limited or even no philo-
sophical value.
I am not claiming that there is nothing to be gleaned from quantitative data about reflective reasoning. 
As I have made clear throughout, I think that quantitative methods are simply a far from perfect tool 
for the job of tapping participants’ conscious thought processes and that it therefore makes sense to 
supplement them with qualitative methods.
I am not endorsing any kind of “qualitative philosophy.” Qualitative researchers sometimes buy into 
dubious, or at least controversial, “philosophies” such as the idea that there is no objective truth, that 
all knowledge is constructed, that such notions are morally problematic, and so on. I am inclined to 
think that endorsing any such thing would be a gross mistake. Fortunately, one need not buy any of 
that stuff in order to make use of qualitative tools.
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I am not claiming that incorporating qualitative tools is easy nor that they don’t have shortcomings. 
Generalizing from qualitative data is problematic both because of the nature of the data and the size 
of the samples one typically has to work with. Qualitative techniques are laborious. This means that 
that the number of participants one can feasibly run is much lower than in more typical experimental 
philosophy. Additionally, for certain types of analysis you need to have members of the research team 
who are not aware of the precise hypotheses of the project. Drawing themes out of qualitative data can 
require a good deal of interpretation on the part of the researcher and so does make it particularly 
difficult to ensure objectivity. Allowing flexible forms of interview means that many variables may 
change between participants. Qualitative tools can really be used only to explore themes and con-
struct theories rather than test concrete hypotheses or establish causal relations. As a result, they can 
sometimes, at least in the short term, lead to less clarity about how people consciously think about the 
relevant issues. So I am definitely not saying that there are no shortcomings. However, take note! The 
fact that the correct toolkit for the job of “immersing oneself in the messy, contingent, highly variable 
truths about how human beings really are” (Knobe and Nichols, 2008, p. 3) includes tools which have 
these shortcomings ought not be too much of a surprise. And, remember, there is no suggestion here 
that experimental philosophers should up-sticks and adopt a purely qualitative methodology.
With these clarifications out the way, and before I conclude, I want to see off one last objection. I’m 
going to consider rather an extreme version of this objection. It should be clear how I would respond 
to less extreme versions.
The objection goes as follows. All conscious thinking (the only stuff qualitative methods have 
access to) is post hoc confabulation. Our conscious thoughts tell us nothing about our real decision 
making, classification of cases, and so on. They tell us only a complete fiction invented by some sort 
of modular commentary box, the only part of the mind that exists at a personal level, which has no 
access to our subpersonal thinking other than via the senses. We have no introspective access and 
we make sense of our own behavior and decisions by observing ourselves in precisely the same way 
as we do the behavior and actions of others. So, qualitative methods do not give us access to anything 
philosophically deep or interesting about ourselves. If the world is as the objection paints it, when we 
claim that something is X, all of our reasoning about why it is X bears absolutely no relation to the 
reasons we declared it to be X in the first place (unless by coincidence), as we have no introspective 
access to those reasons.
Now a model this extreme is probably not correct (but I don’t aim to argue for that here).13 My 
response to this objection is to note that, even if this extreme model of a post hoc, disconnected mind 
were correct, the conclusion that qualitative methods do not give us access to anything philosophi-
cally deep or interesting about ourselves wouldn’t follow. Why wouldn’t the conclusion follow? Quite 
contrary to the idea that in such a scenario qualitative methods wouldn’t give one access to anything 
philosophically interesting, I think that they would give one access to perhaps the most philosophically 
interesting part of the whole setup. In such a scenario we probably should be interested in the causal 
story as to how certain decisions get made and how certain intuitions come to be had, however, much 
more interesting would be the conscious reasoning, justifications and theorizing that we do after the 
fact, precisely because that is where most of our ordinary thinking about philosophically interesting 
things takes place.
6. Wrapping Up
The point of experimental philosophy is to bring empirical methods to philosophy in order to probe 
how people think about philosophically interesting things, such as knowledge, morality, and free-
dom. The point of this paper has been to argue that qualitative methods, which play very little part 
in experimental philosophy at the moment, have a significant contribution to make to this project. I 
have tried to stave off one particular line of resistance—that experimental philosophy is and should 
be focused (almost) exclusively on intuitive processing rather than the more reflective thinking which 
qualitative methods can access. I have argued that, given the general motivations behind experimental 
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philosophy, and given the particular types of philosophical contribution that experimental philosophy 
is taken to be able to make, there is no reason to think that experimental philosophy should be focused 
exclusively on subpersonal intuitive processing, nor would it be justified to claim that qualitative 
methods have no contribution to make.
Notes
1.  For detailed introductions to the methods of experimental philosophy, see Alexander (2012), Knobe (2007), 
and Knobe et al. (2011)., 2011b).
2.  This is an imperfect characterization, as many methods of qualitative research involve, for example, naturalistic 
observation rather than the collection of responses from participants in any form. Here, I will simply restrict 
discussion to the methods involving open responses in some form, but this is not because I think that naturalistic 
observation has no role to play in empirically-minded philosophy.
3.  All articles from “X-Phi of…” categories. Papers in languages other than English were not included. Citations 
for edited collections were not included in this count (the volumes, not the papers therein), nor were book 
reviews or conference summaries.
4.  Thanks to a referee for suggesting this quick survey. Interested readers should also see Knobe (2015), whose 
more systematic survey tracks the extent to which quantitative data is used in philosophy.
5.  Let me be clear. This work is valuable and important. By using this example, I don’t suggest that this paper has 
any problems or any peculiar features. It is simply useful to have an example.
6.  For some philosophical purposes, there might even be a call for a more Socratic form of interview, in which the 
interviewer poses simple challenges to the interviewee’s position.
7.  Ecological validity is defined as “the confidence with which the conclusions of an empirical investigation can be 
generalized to naturally occurring situations in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs” (Colman, 
2015).
8.  A score on the scale is then calculated for the participant. On more simple scales this simply amounts to the 
mean of their responses to the scale items, but less simple scales might measure multiple dimensions or weight 
different items by different amounts.
9.  Feltz and Millan (2015) have recently made a similar point, calling for a turn to greater use of “protocol analysis” 
in experimental philosophy studies relating to freewill and moral responsibility.
10.  A referee points out that one might think that there are important connections between the more specific 
motivations considered in this section and that one might even think that many of them are essentially the same 
motivation. By separating them here, I don’t mean to suggest they are completely distinct. The aim is to show that 
the standard ways of conceptualizing the potential philosophical import of experimental philosophy in no way 
imply that only evidence concerning intuitive thinking, in the more specific sense, is philosophically valuable.
11.  There are some exceptions which I haven’t discussed in the above, for example, Berniūnas and Dranseika (2016), 
De Cruz (2016), Monroe and Malle (2010), and Skulmowski et al. (2015).
12.  Some similar comments are made, albeit briefly, by a number of others (e.g., Devitt, 2015; Feltz & Millan, 2015; 
O’Brien, 2015).
13.  For example, as a reviewer points out, it seems unlikely that reflective reasoning can tell us nothing important 
about intuitions.
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